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Abstract—Grid disturbances occurred on 30th and 31st
of July 2012 leaving millions of Indians in the dark for 
hours. It was understood that in the blackout that 
occurred on 31st of July, hydro power was slowed down 
which led to inadequate power generation while people 
overdrew more power for cooling off since the 
temperature was extremely high. This paper investigates 
the main reasons for the occurrence of the blackout. A 
simplified simulation model was established with 
DIgSILENT Power Factory to reproduce the grid behavior 
when the blackout occurred. After the sensitivity analysis, 
policy and strategies are recommended to enhance the grid 
security and robustness at the end of the paper.
Index Terms—Indian grid, DIgSILENT, Blackout, Strategic 
planning 
I. INTRODUCTION
wo extremely serious blackouts occurred in the Indian 
power grid in the end of July, 2012. Three of the Indian 
Grids were hit by power failure, leaving a huge disturbance in 
the country. The power outage affected 620 million people in 
India [1]. Trains were stopped, and a large amount of 
passengers were stranded on the platform. Traffic was 
congested in large cities including New Delhi and Kolkata due 
to failure of traffic lights. Government employees were told to 
go home as the Chief Minister claimed that power would be 
restored only 10 to 12 hours later [2]. It was claimed that the 
Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh urgently attended 
to attract $400 million to invest in the grid and release the 
burden of electricity deficit, which is holding back economic 
growth [3]. Besides, India will import electricity from Tala, 
Bhutan to relieve the pressure by heavy loading [4]. 
Government of India has agreed to support Bhutan to develop 
hydro power and will purchase no less than 10000 MW of the 
power from Bhutan by 2020 [5]. 
The first blackout occurred at around 2:35 am on the 30th of 
July in the Northern Region grid, which feeds electricity to 9 
states of Northern India. Approximately 36,000 MW was 
affected in this blackout. Only 60% of load in the Northern 
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Region was restored by 11:00 am by means of pumping 
electricity from hydro source in Bhutan and withdrawing  
power from the Eastern and Western Region. The Northern 
Region grid was not supplied with the full load until 7:00pm. 
Afterwards, on 31st of July, there was another disturbance 
which occurred at 1:00 pm, covering almost the entire power 
grid in India, involving the Northern Region, Eastern Region 
and Northeastern Region. Only a pocket Narora was not 
affected. There was about 48,000 MW of load affected in the 
second blackout, which was much more serious than the first 
one. It is reported that over 700 million people in India 
suffered from darkness and production slowdown due to 
electric power deficit. Some important loads like health 
services were affected [6, 7].  
In fact, though the Indian grid has its rule on a rational tariff 
structure on power supply [8], relay mis-operation and 
incorrect setting, high loading due to high temperature and 
high reactive power consumption caused faults in the circuit. 
This has happened on several occasions over the past few 
years [9]. Plenty of media have reported the reasons for the 
blackouts. The Indian power minister, Sushilkumar Shinde, 
had ‘suggested’ that multiple states had overdrawn power 
from the grid [2]. The disturbance that occurred on 31st of 
July was also due to a weak monsoon which led to reduced 
output from the hydro generation plants [10]. This situation 
was aggravated due to the high summer temperatures which 
led to increased consumption of power [2]. Also, some experts 
blame the disturbance on the Indian grid infrastructure, which 
connects with both AC and DC transmission lines. The grids 
can exchange power with other regions flexibly only when DC 
transmission lines are connected between the regions during 
normal operation. In addition, the probability of spreading of 
faults in one region to other regions is very low. It may be that 
the Indian grid could not exploit the benefits of HVDC 
interconnection to maintain grid stability. 
An Enquiry Committee has been founded to investigate the 
factors which led to the causes of the two grid disturbances 
and the report generated gave some critical recommendations 
[7]. One of the most serious problems is that the transmission 
system is very weak since the grid suffered from multiple 
outages. Besides, the Northern Region loads withdraw too 
much power from the Western Region grid thereby 
overloading the corridor linking the two regions. Ineffective 
dispatch cannot prevent the Northern part from over drawing 
electricity from the Western part. Without any fault occurring, 
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the distance relay protecting the Bina-Gwalior link tripped 
under zone 3 conditions, thus causing the Western Region to 
separate from the Northern Region.  
This paper will investigate the two disturbances and try to 
locate the main reasons for the occurrence of these two 
blackouts. A simple model is established with the DIgSILENT 
Power Factory environment [11], and some sensitivity 
analysis has been done to study the performance of entire grid. 
The strategy, policy and recommendations will be developed 
to reduce the blackouts from happening in the future.  
II. EVENTS DURING THE GRID DISTURBANCES
Before the disturbance occurrence, Northern Region grid 
imported power from Eastern Region, Western Region and 
Northeastern Region. Besides, the Eastern region imported 
1127MW from Bhutan, a country located to the northeast of 
India. The pre-disturbance generation and demand with power 
importing and exporting conditions are shown in Table 1. It is 
worthy noting that few lines were under maintenance few 
hours before the collapse happening [12].  
Table 1. Generation and Demand Conditions with power import 
and export before disturbances 
Region Generation 
(MW) 
Demand 
(MW) 
Import 
(MW) 
Northern 32636 38322 5686
Eastern 12452 12213 -239(Import
from Bhutan
1127MW)
Western 33024 28053 -6229
Northeastern 1367 1314 -53
Total 79479 79479
After the first disturbance, Northern Region grid could only 
extract power from the Eastern Region after the tripping of the 
Bina-Gwalior line which is the direct link from North to West. 
However, the link between the Western Region and the 
Eastern Region was still in operation, which caused power 
swing between Northern and Eastern Regions. Finally, the line 
between Eastern and Northern was cut out as it could not 
tolerate such destabilization, leaving the Northern Region grid 
in islanded mode. The next day, loads of the Northern Region 
extracted power from the Western-Eastern-Northern Region 
after losing the Bina-Gwalior line. However, this time the 
power swing centre is in the Eastern Region. Some parts of the 
Eastern Region and the entire Western Region grid were 
isolated from the NEW grid, which caused the power swing in 
the link from Northern Region to Eastern Region. Therefore, 
the Northern Region was separated from the NEW grid as well. 
These multiple faults led to the grid collapse. With the tripping 
of the generators in the Western Region to balance the power 
system frequency, loads in the Western Region did not suffer 
from the disturbances too much. Loads in Southern Region 
grid also met the demand requirement by extracting power 
from the Western Region.  
III. MODELING 
In the paper, a simplified model was developed to simulate the 
grid behavior when the disturbance was started with 
DIgSILENT Power Factory software Package. Preliminary 
data reported by National Load Dispatch Centre, Power 
System Operation Corporation Limited at 18:30 31st of July, 
2012 has been used in the model to investigate the dynamic 
performance under various scenarios that happened at 13:00 
on the day [13].  
Each part of the NEW grid involved in the blackout has been 
considered as an equivalent generation and load. The total 
load demand in each sector has been listed in Table 2. And it 
is not difficult to simply calculate that the Western Region 
load as 32612MW. In addition, inter-regional exchange is also 
specified which is illustrated in Table 3. The calculated total 
generation is shown in Table 4. Because the Northeastern 
Region is directly connected with Eastern Region grid, Eastern 
Region grid generation is assumed as the summation of both 
generation in Eastern Region grid and Northeastern Region 
grid.
Table 2. Load Demand met in the preliminary report 
Region  Demand (MW) 
Northern 27320
Eastern 12164
Northeastern 1142
Total 73238
Figure 1 shows the model developed to represent the Indian 
grid, in which the two disturbances occurred, with 
DIgSILENT. The Northern Region and the Western Region 
are connected by, among others, a 400kV double circuit line 
between Agra and Gwalior. One circuit of this line has been 
out of service for up gradation to 765kV. The Surge 
Impedance Loading (SIL) of the remaining circuit is 691 MW. 
There are other circuits between these two regions. Similarly 
the Eastern Region is connected to the Western Region as well 
as the Northern Region. The interconnections are shown in the 
figure. Some of the circuits connecting these regions were out 
of service prior to the disturbance. Line-tie parameters for 
model establishing are given in Table 5. Two lines are 
considered between the Northern Region and the Western 
Region. One represents the Agra-Gwalior line while the other 
line for the remaining interconnections. Both lines are 
assumed to have the same parameters. Each region was 
modeled for hydro and thermal generations and one lumped 
load.  
The installed capacities of hydro and thermal generations in 
each region are assumed as follows: 
Northern Region: 
10000MW Hydro generation and 13395MW Thermal 
generation; 
Eastern Region: 
3000MW Hydro generation and 10196MW Thermal 
generation; 
Western Region: 
6000MW Hydro generation and 30647MW Thermal 
generation allocated. 
Fig. 1. Simplified India grid for disturbance investigation 
Table 3. Inter-region Exchange in the India power grid. 
Imported by Northern Region 
(MW) 
Exported by Eastern Region 
(MW) 
ER-NR 1825 ER-SR 895
WR-NR 2100 ER-NR 1825
ER-WR -1935
ER-NER 181
Total 3925 Total 1066
Table 4. Generation in each region 
Region Generation (MW)
Northern 23395
Eastern 13196
Western 36647
The parameters of the governors and the AVR have been 
taken as the default parameters available in the software. Also 
both hydro and thermal generation are coupled to the same bus 
to represent the total inflow of power from a particular region. 
The steady state power flow indicates that the lines between 
NR and WR are overloaded substantially while the lines 
between ER and NR and the lines between WR and ER are 
almost 100% loaded. The frequency of the system, however, 
seems to be within the permissible limits. The tripping of the 
Agra- Gwalior line caused an overloading of the other lines 
between NR and WR which resulted in the tripping of these 
lines. The tripping of the lines has been simulated by putting 
the Agra-Gwalior line out of service at t=60 seconds and other 
lines between NR and WR at t=60.5 seconds. This is to 
simulate the effect of cascade tripping of the lines between the 
North and the West. Figure 2 and Figure 3 respectively 
illustrate the frequency of Northern Region grid and changes 
in rotor angle between Northern Region and Western Region 
when the transmission lines linking these regions trip. 
Sensitivity analysis for investigating the grid robustness will 
be done in some cases below. 
IV. CASE STUDY
1. Case 1 Change of generations in the north
According to the background and the preliminary report [13], 
loads in the Northern Region grid are usually larger than the 
generation, Northern Region grid need to import power from 
other grids. This case is studying about behaviors of the entire 
grids when increasing the capacity investment or injecting 
more spinning reserve power into the Northern Region grid. 
Fig. 2. Northern Region grid frequency  
Fig. 3. Rotor angle of the Northern Region thermal generator refer 
to Western Region thermal generator 
Table 5. Parameters of the tie-line connecting between regions 
Regions WR-NR WR-ER NR-ER 
Voltage 
level 
400kV 400kV 400kV 
Line
reactance 
1.9623 /km 0.2381 /km 0.3333
Line
resistance 
0.109 /km 0.013 /km 0.0185 /km
Distance 118km 420km 300km 
Surge 
Impedance 
Loading 
691MW 1600MW 1600MW 
Fig. 4. (a) 
Fig. 4. (b) 
Fig. 4. (c) 
Fig. 4. (d) 
Fig. 4. (e)
Fig. 4. Changes of Northern Region grid frequency when (a) thermal generation in the northern region increased to 105%; (b) thermal 
generation in the northern region increased to 110%; (c) thermal generation in the northern region increased to 115%; (d) thermal generation in 
the northern region increased to 120%; (e) thermal generation in the northern region increased to 125%. 
A. Increasing the thermal generation power output
The thermal power plant output power is increased from 100% 
to 125% with a step of 5%. The results of the frequency 
measured in the Northern Region bus are shown in Figure 4. 
As can be seen in the diagram, Northern Region frequency 
fluctuation is getting smaller with the increased thermal 
generation output power. It is worthy noting that after the 
transmission line was out of service, frequency in the Northern 
Region can be recovered to the stable range when the thermal 
generation output power is higher than 115%. Owing to the 
generation increasing in the Northern Region, it could meet 
such heavy load without importing energy from other grid. 
Table 6. Maximum and minimum value of Northern Region 
frequency when hydro power is changing 
Hydro North Minimum value Maximum value 
100% 49.8946Hz 50.0321Hz 
105% 49.902 Hz 50.039 Hz 
110% 49.890 Hz 50.042 Hz 
115% 49.956 Hz 50.006 Hz 
120% 49.965 Hz 50.006 Hz 
125% 49.974 Hz 50.005 Hz 
Table 7. Maximum and minimum value of rotor angle in the 
Northern Region when hydro power is changing 
Hydro North Minimum value Maximum value 
100% -178.6deg 179.5231deg 
105% -179.915 deg 177.923 deg 
110% -179.973 deg 179.878 deg 
115% -164.864 deg -56.879 deg
120% -116.074 deg -46.907 deg
125% -84.613 deg -37.685 deg
B. Increasing the hydro power output
The hydro generator output is increased from 100% to 125%, 
maximum and minimum values of Northern Region frequency 
and rotor angle are recorded in Tables 6 and 7. With the 
increasing capacity injected to the system, frequency is much 
more stable when the line Agra-Gwailor and Northern to 
Western line are out of service. Rotor angle deviation between 
north bus and west bus is getting smaller. Differences between 
minimum and maximum power from east to north is 
narrowing. 
2. Case 2 Wind generation investment in Western Region
This case is to study the frequency, rotor angle difference and 
power imported from Eastern grid to Northern Region. In this 
case, the Western Region grid has wind farms with 
asynchronous machines. The wind farm Capacity is set in 
percentages of the output power generated by the thermal 
power plants in the Western Region grid. Table 8 gives 
information on maximum and minimum value frequency, 
imported power from east to north, and rotor angle difference 
with wind penetration level increased from 10% to 26%. In 
accordance with the data recorded in the table, frequency 
fluctuation becomes smaller and smaller. When wind 
penetration level is around 20%, the frequency cannot even 
reach 50Hz after breaking the line linking Northern Region to 
Western Region.  
Imported power from North to East is smaller before the 
occurrence of the disturbance, because Northern Region could 
import power from Western Region directly. After the 
disturbance, the Northern Region could only obtain power 
from Eastern grid. The power from Northern to Eastern 
increases suddenly to an extremely high level to meet the 
demand in the Northern Region. Generators go out of step at 
t=70 seconds, and the rotor angle becomes smaller but 
fluctuates strongly after disturbance. It is obviously stated that 
with wind penetration getting large in the Western Region grid, 
Northern Region grid cannot effectively extract power from 
the Eastern and Western Region grid.  
V. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The paper gives a brief event sequence of the disturbance that 
occurred on 30th and 31st of July 2012. Reasons for the 
disturbance have been discussed. grid infrastructure, which is 
applying both AC and DC transmission lines to connect 
regions, is one of the main problems for these disturbances. 
The generation production is dependent too much on the 
weather condition, and the power cannot be restored within a 
short time. Some sensitivity analysis has been done to 
investigate the level of the disturbance affected the grid when 
power generated in the North and wind penetration level in the 
Western Region grid is increased. Increasing the power output 
in the Northern Region is a simple solution when the load is 
increased in the Northern Region grid as then the transmission 
line linking the regions is not overloaded. Wind generation in 
the Western Region grid cannot supply enough energy from 
the Western-Eastern-Northern area when the lines between 
Northern Region and Western Region are out of service. It can 
be foreseen that a coordinated dispatch schedule is essential 
for a secure electricity supply. From the blackout, it also 
suggests that increasing rate of generation capacity is lacking 
behind the economy development rate. It is important to plan 
the electricity infrastructures at least few years in advance. 
Table 8. Maximum and Minimum value of frequency, power from North to East, and rotor angle difference 
when wind penetration is getting large in the Western Region 
Wind generation 
(% of Western 
Region thermal 
generation) 
Frequency Northern grid to Eastern grid power Rotor angle difference 
Orig min max Orig min max Orig min max 
10% 50 49.737 50.026 -1722.354 -2577.435 2884.222 -100.644 -179.727 179.941
12% 50 49.742 50.043 -1722.345 -2577.467 2880.186 -100.177 -179.909 179.769
14% 50 49.745 50.014 -1722.337 -2577.489 2880.589 --99.703 -179.988 179.968
16% 50 49.746 50.002 -1722.327 -2577.534 2880.229 -99.220 -179.950 179.979
18% 50 49.746 49.994 -1722.319 -2577.565 2879.119 -98.729 -179.843 179.914
20% 50 49.744 49.991 -1722.310 -2577.575 2877.809 -98.231 -179.909 179.888
22% 50 49.740 49.992 -1722.300 -2577.620 2876.276 -97.725 -179.859 179.981
24% 50 49.738 50.002 -1722.292 -2577.640 2874.505 -97.209 -179.985 179.901
26% 50 49.776 50.035 -1722.283 -2577.651 2872.762 -97.687 -179.993 179.993
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